

Message Text

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USIA-06 ACDA-12 IO-13 /084 W
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R 281359Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4332
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USBERLIN
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 21415

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, BQG
SUBJECT: FRG CONCERNS ABOUT A SOVIET CALL FOR QA
CONSULTATIONS

REFS: A) USBER 3191; B) BONN 20855; C) USBER 3126;
D) USBER 3121; E) BONN 20577; F) SECTO 12088;
G) USBER 3098; H) USBER 3034; I) USBER 2881

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE FRG HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN IN THE
BONN GROUP THAT THE SOVIETS MAY BE BUILDING A CASE FOR
CONSULTATIONS AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE QA. THE FOREIGN
OFFICE WORKING LEVEL HAS INFORMED FOREIGN MINISTER
GENSCHER THAT IT IS EXAMINING THE QUESTION. UPON
COMPLETION, THE STUDY WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE FEDERAL
CABINET. AT THE DECEMBER 22 BONN GROUP MEETING, THE
FRG REP (VON BRANMUEHL) DREW FROM A REPORT BY AN FRG
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE THAT "HIGH WESTERN DIPLOMATS" IN
WEST BERLIN MAINTAIN THAT THE SOVIETS ARE INDEED
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BUILDING UP A CASE FOR CONSULTATIONS. ALL BONN GROUPS
EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT SUCH A REPORT, AND ASSURED THE
FRG THAT WE HAD NO SUCH REPORTS NOR WERE THE ALLIES
CARRYING ON DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WITHOUT INFORM-
ING THE FRG. THE FOLLOWING DETAILED REPORT OF THE
DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUBJECT IN THE BONN GROUP IS
PROVIDED FOR BACKGROUND. WHILE THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT

BE EXCLUDED THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BUILDING A CASE FOR CONSULTATIONS, WE BELIEVE THE CONCLUSION REACHED AT THE QUAD MEETING (REF F) IS MORE LIKELY THE CORRECT ONE. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ANY REPORTS ADDRESSEES MIGHT HAVE CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EASTERN BID FOR CONSULTATIONS. END SUMMARY.

1. AT THE DECEMBER 20 BONN GROUP MEETING, FRG REP VON BRAUNMUEHL RECALLED THAT AT A RECENT SESSION BONN GROUP REPS HAD EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN A GENERAL DISCUSSION ON THE SOVIETS' BERLIN POLICY. HE SAID THE SOVIETS SAW AN INTENSIFICATION OF FRG ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN. ABRASIMOV AND FALIN HAD RAISED THE TONE OF THEIR REPROACHES ABOUT THE FEDERAL PRESENCE IN BERLIN IN RECENT MEETINGS. IT STRUCK THE FRG THAT ABRASIMOV AND TYUTYUNOV, IN HIS NOVEMBER 29 PROTEST (REF H) HAD TRIED TO LINK RECENT FRG STATEMENTS ABOUT BERLIN AS A FEDERAL "LAND" AND CERTAIN FRG ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN, IMPLYING THAT THESE ACTIVITIES WERE AN ATTEMPT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT BERLIN WAS INDEED A FEDERAL LAND. UNQTE

2. IN THIS REGARD VON BRAUNMUEHL COMMENTED THAT THE VON DOHNANY; STATEMENT (REF E) FOUND LITTLE FAVOR WITH THE SOVIETS. ABRASIMOV DID NOT MENTION IT DURING HIS MEETING WITH BRUNET (REFS C AND D), AND TYUTYUNOV DISCUSSED IT ONLY BRIEFLY. THEY SEEMED TO REGARD THIS CONFIDENTIAL

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CLARIFICATION AS INSUFFICIENT, NOT AS EVIDENCE THAT THE FRG WAS NOT TREATING WEST BERLIN IN SUCH A WAY AS TO VIOLATE THE QA.

3. IN RECENT MONTHS ABRASIMOV HAD BEEN HAMMERING AWAY WITH THE INTERPRETATION THAT WHAT WAS NOT EXPLICITLY ALLOWED BY THE QA WAS FORBIDDEN. THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO STRESSING THEIR CLAIM TO HAVE A SAY ON FEDERAL ACTIVITIES IN WEST BERLIN. THIS HAD BEEN SAID BEFORE, BUT REPEATED RECENTLY. IN ABRASIMOV'S LAST TALK WITH THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR, HE HAD TAKEN A MENACING TONE, ESPECIALLY WHEN HE SAID THAT IF THE ALLIES DID NOT FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATIONS THEN THE SOVIETS COULD LOOK FOR ANOTHER PARTNER.

4. THE UK REP (EYERS) ASKED VON BRAUNMUEHL WHAT HE THOUGHT THE SOVIET STATEMENT MEANT. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID IT SEEMED TO BE A REPEAT OF THE KHRUSCHEV ULTIMATUM, BUT THE FRG BELIEVED IT SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TOO SERIOUSLY. IT WAS PROBABLY ONLY A BLUFF MEANT TO INTIMIDATE.

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USIA-06 ACDA-12 IO-13 /084 W
-----022767 281454Z /40

R 281359Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4333
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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5. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT EAST EUROPEAN SOURCES IN EAST BERLIN HAD TOLD THE FRG THAT THE SOVIETS WERE CONCENTRATING ON BERLIN'S PARTICIPATION IN A DIRECTLY-ELECTED EC PARLIAMENT AND STOBBE'S UPCOMING TURN AS PRESIDENT OF THE BUNDESRAT. THE FRG BELIEVED THAT THE EC SITUATION WAS DEVELOPING BY SMALL STEPS, AGAINST ANYONE OF WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO BUILD UP A CASE ON WHICH THEY COULD BASE A PROTEST. THE BUNDESRAT PRESIDENCY MIGHT BE A DIFFERENT MATTER. IN CONTRAST TO THE EC, THE SOVIETS HAD NOT YET MENTIONED THE BUNDESRAT ISSUE. THEY MIGHT WANT TO SPRING IT ON THE ALLIES. IF SO, THEIR SILENCE TO DATE WAS NO REASON FOR A SENSE OF RELIEF.

6. THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE AIMING TOWARD CONSULTATIONS. ABRASIMOV'S REMARK THAT CERTAIN CIRCLES WERE TRYING TO REVISE THE QA WAS ALSO INTERESTING.

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7. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT THE GDR HAD MADE A FORMAL CLAIM RECENTLY TO HAVE A RIGHT TO CHECK SEALED TRUCKS ON THE TRANSIT ROUTES DESPITE THE PROVISIONS OF THE TRANSIT AGREEMENT (REPORTED MORE FULLY BY SEPTTEL). IT HAD ALSO SHARPENED THE CHECKS ON PASSENGER CARS, CLAIMING SUSPECTED MISUSE. THIS IN ITSELF WAS NOT BASIS ENOUGH TO CONCLUDE THAT THE GDR WAS PREPARING SOMETHING, BUT IF CONSULTATIONS WERE CALLED, HE COULD IMAGINE THAT THESE GDR CLAIMS WOULD BE USED AGAINST THE ALLIES.

8. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO CLAIM THAT SECRET AGREEMENTS EXIST IN THE CONTEXT OF THE QA, WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE NOT HONORED (REF B).

9. VON BRAUNMUEHL CONCLUDED THAT ONE POSSIBLE PURPOSE OF THE SOVIET SIGNALS WAS TO INTIMIDATE THE WEST INTO NOT MAKING USE OF ALL THE POSSIBILITIES IN BERLIN TO WHICH IT WAS LEGALLY ENTITLED. AT THE MOMENT, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WAS NOT SEIZED OF THE MATTER. THE WORKING LEVEL WAS CONSIDERING IT IN ORDER TO INFORM THE FEDERAL CABINET. OF COURSE, THE TOP OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF THIS STUDY.

10. EYERS ASKED IF THE FRG HAD COMPARED RECENT SOVIET REMARKS WITH REMARKS THEY HAD MADE IN RECENT YEARS. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT HE HAD NOT. HIS IMPRESSIONS WERE BASED ON ABRASIMOV'S INTERVIEW WITH "DER TAGESSPIEGEL" (REF I) AND REMARKS BY FALIN, ABRASIMOV AND OTHERS.

11. EYERS SAID THAT HE HAD NOTED IN HIS EMBASSY LAST WEEK THAT ABRASIMOV HAD NOT SAID ANYTHING VERY NEW OR VERY STERN. HE HAD COMPLAINED ABOUT VISITS OF FEDERAL MINISTERS AND THAT THEY HAD EXERCISED DIRECT STATE AUTHORITY IN BERLIN. EYERS SAID THAT IN THIS REGARD HE CONFIDENTIAL

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WAS AWARE ONLY OF THE MAIHOFFER VISIT, BUT ABRASIMOV DID NOT EVEN MENTION THIS. ABRASIMOV WAS ON WEAK GROUNDS ABOUT FRG MEETINGS ON BERLIN. HE HAD ALSO UNDERPLAYED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EC DIRECT ELECTIONS BY PUTTING THAT SUBJECT ON THE SAME LEVEL AS FRG MEETINGS IN BERLIN. THE ONLY THREAT ABRASIMOV MADE WAS THAT THIS MIGHT LEAD TO AN UNHAPPY END. BY SOVIET STANDARDS THIS WAS NOT STRONG. HE WAS SURPRISED THE FRG FOUND SO MUCH CAUSE FOR CONCERN.

12. EYERS SAID, HOWEVER, THAT HE SHARED THE FRG'S CONCERN ABOUT GDR MEASURES ON THE TRANSIT ROUTES. HE FELT THAT IT DID NOT MATTER HOW WELL THE GDR KNEW THE FRG; THE GDR PROBABLY THOUGHT THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

COULD HAVE DONE SOMETHING ABOUT THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION ON EXFILTRATION ASSISTANCE. THE DECISION WAS UNHELPFUL. EYERS THEN ASKED THE FRENCH PERCEPTION OF AMBASSADOR BRUNET'S VISIT WITH ABRASIMOV.

13. THE FRENCH REP (RICHARD) NOTED THAT HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE MEETING, BUT IT HAD APPARENTLY REMAINED ON THE LEVEL OF GENERALITIES. VERY FEW SPECIFIC ISSUES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. ABRASIMOV'S "THREAT" HAD COME AFTER BRUNET HAD CONTRADICTED HIM. BRUNET HIMSELF HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE VERY UPSET BY SOME FEDERAL INITIATIVES. BOTH BRUNET AND RICHARD FELT THAT ABRASIMOV'S REMARKS DID NOT DIFFER MUCH FROM PREVIOUS STATEMENTS, ALTHOUGH THE INSISTENCE WITH WHICH THE SOVIETS EXPRESSED THEIR IRRITATION ABOUT FRG ACTIVITIES IN BERLIN HAD PERHAPS NOT BEEN PUT IN THIS WAY BEFORE.

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USIA-06 ACDA-12 IO-13 /084 W
-----022834 281455Z /40

R 281359Z DEC 77
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4334
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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14. THE US REP ASKED IF THE FRG HAD A VIEW AS TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOVIET AND GDR INTERESTS DIFFERED. THE US HAD HEARD, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE GDR HAD SAID THAT THE LANDTAG CAUCUS FROM LOWER SAXONY SHOULD NOT FORMALLY ASK FOR PERMISSION TO VISIT EAST BERLIN, BUT SIMPLY DO

IT (REF G). WHEN THE CAUCUS PERSISTED IN ASKING FOR PERMISSION, THE GDR DENIED IT, BUT WAS ALMOST APOLOGETIC IN EXPLAINING THAT IT WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO ALLOW IT, SUGGESTING SOVIET PRESSURE. WAS THE GDR TRYING NOT TO EXACERBATE FRG/GDR RELATIONS? SECONDLY, HOW COORDINATED WERE THE SOVIETS? ABRASIMOV GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF BEING TOUGHER THAN OTHER SOVIETS. FOR EXAMPLE, RADIO MOSCOW'S COMMENTARY OF NOVEMBER 22 ON SCHMIDT'S STATEMENTS HAD BEEN QUITE FAVORABLE AS SUCH SOVIET STATEMENTS GO.

15. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID IT WAS HARD TO KNOW THE EXTENT OF THE CONGRUENCE OF SOVIET AND GDR INTERESTS. A GDR
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SOURCE, BAUMGAERTL OF THE GDR PERMANENT REPRESENTATION, HAD SAID THERE WERE DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN THE GDR AND THE SOVIETS. BRAUMGAERTL HAD ALSO REMARKED THAT DIFFICULTIES IN BERLIN SOMETIMES CAUSED THE GDR TO PAY A HIGH PRICE. AS FOR THE CAUCUS VISIT, THE GDR HAD INDEED HINTED THAT IT DEPENDED ON THE SOVIETS, AND NOT SO MUCH ON THE GDR.

16. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID ABRASIMOV DID TAKE A HARD LINE. FALIN HAD INDICATED HIS SATISFICATION WITH THE VON DOHNANYI STATEMENT, BUT ABRASIMOV NEVER EVEN MENTIONED IT. TYUTYUNOV PLAYED IT DOWN AS IF IT WERE NO MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN THE STATEMENTS BY BAUM AND HARTKOPF. (THE US REP COMMENTED THAT TYUTYUNOV SEEMS TO BE THE "BAD GUY" AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN EAST BERLIN. VON BRAUNMUEHL AGREED.) THEY HAD GIVEN THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE BUILDING UP A CASE FOR CONSULTATIONS BASED ON THESE EARLIER STATEMENTS; THEY SEEMED PIQUED THAT THE FRG, THROUGH VON DOHNANYI'S STATEMENT, HAD RUINED THEIR ARGUMENTATION.

17. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THERE WERE ALSO RUMORS OF PERSONAL TENSION BETWEEN HONECKER AND ABRASIMOV. WHEN ABRASIMOV WAS REAPPOINTED TO THE GDR, THE FRG HAD ASSUMED IT WOULD NOT BE HIS ROLE TO MAKE THINGS EASIER.

18. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO DRAMATIZE FRG CONCERNS. THE FOREIGN OFFICE WAS NOT GLOOMY, BUT WAS SIMPLY TRYING TO ANALYZE THE SITUATION. SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID, THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD HEARD FROM ALLIED SOURCES IN BERLIN THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING UP A CASE FOR CONSULTATIONS. HE SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER THE MATTER AND PERHAPS PREPARE FOR SUCH A
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CONTINGENCY. OUR OWN CASE WAS FAIRLY GOOD; IT MIGHT EVEN BE POSSIBLE TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF VIOLATIONS OF THE QA BY THE GDR.

19. ALL REPS EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT THE FRG HAD OBTAINED THE FOREGOING INFORMATION FROM ALLIED SOURCES. EYERS SAID THE WHOLE THING WAS NEWS TO HIM. THE US REP COMMENTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN SPECULATION AMONG THE ALLIES FOR YEARS ON THE SUBJECT, BUT HE KNEW OF NO FORMAL CONSIDERATION OF THE MATTER.

20. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID HE TOOK IT THAT THE ALLIES WERE NOT CONCERNED. EYERS REPLIED THAT WE WERE NO MORE CONCERNED THAN USUAL. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID IT WAS NEVERTHELESS AN INTERESTING POSSIBILITY. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHEN WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY TIME FOR THE SOVIETS TO CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS. HE SUSPECTED IT WOULD BE WHEN STOBBE'S IMPENDING ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE BUNDESRAT BECOMES PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. (COMMENT: THIS WAS ALSO VAN WELL'S VIEW AT THE QUAD MEETING.)

21. EYERS ASKED IF THE SOVIETS MIGHT NOT REQUEST TALKS WHEN THE FINAL TWO PIECES OF FRG LEGISLATION PROVIDING FOR EC DIRECT ELECTIONS ARE PASSED. VON BRAUNMUEHL CONSIDERED THIS AN UNLIKELY TIME; SUCH THINGS WERE SMALL STEPS WHICH WERE DIFFICULT TO ATTACK.

22. AT THE DECEMBER 22 BONN GROUP MEETING, VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT HIS SUPERIORS HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO RELEASE TO THE ALLIES A BUNDESNACHRICHTENDIENST (BND-FEDERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) REPORT ABOUT A POSSIBLE SOVIET CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS. HE HAD ALLUDED TO THIS

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USIA-06 ACDA-12 IO-13 /084 W

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R 281359Z DEC 77
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4335
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
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INFORMATION AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION. ACCORDING TO THE REPORT, A HIGH SED FUNCTIONARY SAID THAT GDR THREATS REGARDING BERLIN AND TRANSIT TRAFFIC WERE AIMED AT A SOVIET CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS. THE BND REPORT SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN CONFIRMED BY A HIGH WESTERN DIPLOMAT IN WEST BERLIN, WHO SAID THAT THE SOVIETS HAD THE MEANS TO FORCE THROUGH THEIR CLAIMS.

23. THE REPORT CONTINUED THAT THE WESTERN ALLIES FEAR THAT CONSULTATIONS ON THE QA WOULD RESULT IN A NARROWING OF THE RANGE OF ITS INTERPRETATION TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF THE ALLIED POSITION. WESTERN DIPLOMATS WERE SAYING THAT THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO MAKE THE FRG ADHERE STRICTLY TO THE QA AS THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY TO AVOID CONSULTATIONS. THEY CONFIRMED THAT THEY FELT SOME GDR COMPLAINTS WERE JUSTIFIED.

24. A HIGH SED FUNCTIONARY SAID THAT ACTIONS BY THE GDR FIT INTO THE SCHEME OF POLITICAL ACTIONS OF A JURIDICAL
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NATURE TAKEN IN RECENT WEEKS. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT THE GDR WAS ACTING IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS AND OTHER EASTERN ALLIANCE PARTNERS. HE WARNED THE WEST NOT TO TAKE THE SITUATION LIGHTLY. HE SAID THAT IN THE VIEW OF THE SED LEADERSHIP, THE SOVIETS WOULD CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AT VARIOUS TIMES IN RECENT WEEKS, SOVIET REPS HAD EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE FUNCTIONING OF THE QA TO THE WESTERN ALLIES; FURTHERMORE, THEIR TONE HAD BECOME AGGRESSIVE AND IN THE NATURE OF AN ULTIMATUM. (THE BND REPORT ADDED THAT THIS INFORMATION HAD ALSO BEEN CONFIRMED BY WESTERN DIPLOMATS IN BERLIN.)

25. THE REPORT CONCLUDED THAT HIGH WESTERN DIPLOMATS HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE BUILDING UP A STRONG INITIAL POSITION FOR THE START OF CONSULTATIONS. THESE DIPLOMATS FELT IT EVEN MORE NECESSARY THAN BEFORE TO

EXAMINE CAREFULLY AND CRITICALLY FRG TIES TO WEST BERLIN. ONLY STRICT APPLICATION OF THE QA COULD PREVENT A SOVIET CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS. THE ALLIES' GREATEST CONCERN WAS THE TRANSIT ROUTES. ON THIS THE SOVIETS WOULD REMAIN IN THE BACKGROUND, WITH THE GDR DOING THE HATCHET WORK. THIS COULD BE DONE BECAUSE THE FRG/GDR TRANSIT AGREEMENT WAS QUITE OPEN TO INTERPRETATION, MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR THE GDR TO TAKE DISRUPTIVE MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE FORMALLY WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT.

26. EYERS SAID THAT HE FELT THAT THE GDR WAS BUILDING UP A CASE ON THE TRANSIT ROUTES WITH WHICH IT COULD APPEAL TO WORLD OPINION. HE CITED THE RECENT GDR CONVICTION OF BND OFFICERS FOR ALLEGEDLY RUNNING PEOPLE INTO THE GDR IN "FLAGRANT VIOLATION" OF THE QA AND THE RECENT RULING BY THE GDR SUPREME COURT ABOUT EXFILTRATION

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ORGANIZATIONS USING THE TRANSIT ROUTES.

27. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE GDR WOULD DO ANYTHING MORE ON THE TRANSIT ROUTES THAN CONTINUE TO BREAK SEALS AND SEARCH CARS. HE DID NOT TAKE THIS LIGHTLY, BUT CONSIDERED IT LESS SERIOUS THAN EXCLUSIONS. THE SOVIETS, HOWEVER, MIGHT ASK FOR CONSULTATIONS PARTLY ON THE BASIS OF ALLEGED MISUSE OF THE TRANSIT ROUTES.

28. EYERS DISAGREED. HE SAID THAT IF CONSULTATIONS DID

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USIA-06 ACDA-12 IO-13 /084 W
-----022921 281457Z /40
R 281359Z DEC 77

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INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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COME THEIR THEME WOULD BE FRG TIES TO WEST BERLIN. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID HE FELT THAT ANY CONSULTATIONS WOULD BE VERY BROAD, ENCOMPASSING ALL ISSUES. ON ACCESS AND MISUSE, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT EXPECT MUCH GIVE ON THE ALLIED SIDE. THEY WOULD DEMAND MAJOR CONCESSIONS ON TIES.

29. THE US REP SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT BOTH THE FRG AND GDR COURT DECISIONS ON EXFILTRATION ASSISTANCE HAD BEEN A SUBJECT OF INTEREST IN BERLIN, BUT THAT HE HAD HEARD NOTHING ABOUT SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS.

30. THE FRENCH REP (GAUSSOT) SAID THAT HE HAD ATTENDED AMBASSADOR BRUNET'S LAST MEETING WITH ABRASIMOV AND HAD DONE THE REPORTING. HE POINTED OUT THAT HIS REPORT SUMMARIZED THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MEETING; FROM HIS PERSPECTIVE THESE WERE MOSTLY THE NEGATIVE STATEMENTS WHICH ABRASIMOV HAD MADE. THE GENERAL TONE, HOWEVER, CONFIDENTIAL

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WAS NOT AGGRESSIVE. ALSO, ABRASIMOV HAD SAID NOTHING ABOUT THE TRANSIT ROUTES, BUT HAD SPOKEN ENTIRELY ABOUT BERLIN/FRG TIES.

31. COMMENT: RUMORS THAT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO REQUEST CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN CIRCULATING FOR YEARS, BUT WE ARE AT A LOSS TO EXPLAIN THE SUDDEN CONCERN OF THE WORKING LEVEL AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE. WE NOTE THAT SUCH CONCERN WAS REFLECTED NEITHER IN STOBBE'S RECENT REVIEW OF THE PAST YEAR (REF A) NOR AT THE QUAD DINNER IN BRUSSELS. WE HAVE PROVIDED SUCH A FULL ACCOUNT OF THE BONN GROUP DISCUSSION BECAUSE THE CONCERN EXPRESSED MAY HAVE AN EFFECT IN THE FUTURE UPON THE WAY IN WHICH THE FOREIGN OFFICE PERCEIVES THE ALLIED ATTITUDE TOWARD THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S TIES WITH BERLIN.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETINGS, BERLIN QUADRIpartite MATTERS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 28-Dec-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BONN21415
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770483-0381
Format: TEL
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Litigation Code IDs:
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Message ID: 21055efc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 USBERLIN 3191, 78 BONN 20855, 78 USBERLIN 3126
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 04-Apr-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 123572
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: FRG CONCERNS ABOUT A SOVIET CALL FOR QA CONSULTATIONS
TAGS: PGOV, GE, UR, BQG
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/21055efc-c188-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009